In 2010 the
IMF admitted that the 2008 crisis
has exposed flaws in the precrisis policy framework, forced policymakers to explore new policies during the crisis, and forces us to think about the architecture of postcrisis macroeconomic policy.
Sounded like an admission of guilt, sort of. It is worth remembering that
the IMF's
primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with one other.
In 2011 the IMF reviewed the year and
their policies, inluding austerity
First, post the 2008-09 crisis, the world economy is pregnant with multiple equilibria—self-fulfilling outcomes of pessimism or optimism, with major macroeconomic implications
Pregnant with multi equilibria - not a particularly happy prognosis, is it?
Paul Krugman points to one of Blanchard's
equilibria as being particularly worrisome, the one about investors wanting both growth and austerity (the Blanchard diagnosis of such an
equilibria is
schizophrenia)
Some preliminary estimates that the IMF is working on suggest that it does not take large multipliers for the joint effects of fiscal consolidation and the implied lower growth to lead in the end to an increase, not a decrease, in risk spreads on government bonds.
Krugman
observes that
If I have this right, Olivier is suggesting that harsh austerity programs may be literally self-defeating, hurting the economy so much that they worsen fiscal prospects.
In his latest chapter of
Zombie Economics Australian Professor John Quiggin
writes that the
failure of expansionary austerity is already evident.
Predictions that, once the state got out of the way, the private sector
would come roaring back, have proved laughably false. After more than a
year of austerity in the US and Europe, there is no sign of any
recovery. Rather, the risk of another crash looms larger than ever.
Expansionary austerity is not simply a zombie economic
idea. It forms the basis of a political strategy of class war,
undertaken by the financial and political elite (the “1 per cent”) to
hold on to the wealth and power they accumulated during the decades of
market liberalism, and to shift the costs of their own failure on to the
rest of the population.
...
The struggle against the politics of austerity will be a long one, and
often dispiriting. As the experience of the 1920s and 1930s showed, the
forces pushing for austerity are powerful. Nonetheless, they were
defeated in the end, by the New Deal in the US, the Attlee Labour
government in the UK, and the success of social democratic movements and
policies in Europe